TAINTED ELECTIONS
CHAPTER 26 of the book: "From election to coup in Fiji"
http://epress.anu.edu.au/fiji/pdf/ch26.pdf
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It’s a bald question, but one that’s surely unavoidable after the combined
experiences of 2001 and 2006: is it possible ever to hold free and fair elections
in Fiji anymore?
Since 2001, a culture of vote-buying, poll-rigging and manipulation has
seeped into our electoral process and threatens to destroy the very foundations
of our democratic traditions and undermine the integrity of our elections.
The exact nature and extent of the behind-the-scenes manipulation to
engineer the results of the 2006 polls are not fully known, but enough credible
evidence is available to cast serious doubts on the integrity of the 2006 election.
Likewise the 2001 general election. Certainly, no critical observer could give
them a clean bill of health, and one notices that even the European Union
(EU) observer mission in its final report has this time fallen short of declaring
the elections free and fair. Indeed, the numerous concerns it has raised and the
recommendations it has made, on the conduct of the 2006 and future polls
is tantamount to saying, in diplomatic language, that the 2006 election was
seriously flawed.
A local observer, Father David Arms, is not so constrained in his criticism
of the racial bias and other malpractices he observed during the 2006 poll – to
the point where he has refused to declare the elections free and fair. His final
observations are worth noting for anyone interested in an honest review of the
2006 poll. He concluded that the ethnic imbalance among those conducting the
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elections was ‘a serious blotch on the integrity of the whole electoral process’.
Father Arms further noted:
On the basis particularly of the ethnic bias which was so pervasive in the 2006 elections,
I cannot possibly give a verdict that they were ‘free and fair’.
The elections of 2006 were so administratively biased that the overall results
were undoubtedly influenced thereby.
Many of Father Arms’ observations and concerns are similar to those held
by the Fiji Labour Party (FLP ), and are contained in our fairly comprehensive
report to the EU observer mission and the Electoral Commission. I am
of the opinion that much of the mess and malpractice that characterized
the 2006 poll, deliberate or otherwise, could have been avoided had the
Electoral Commission paid heed to a lengthy report I sent to the chairman
of the Commission as early as 5 May 2005 highlighting the main problems
that marred the 2001 election and urging him to ensure they were not
repeated.
The 2001 general election
As a precursor to the 2006 poll, the 2001 election set the trend for what
should have been expected. For the first time in Fiji’s electoral history, there
was massive vote-buying in the lead-up to the 2001 general election by the
Laisenia Qarase-led interim administration – as evidenced by the $30 million
agricultural scam, currently before the courts. No other government before
this had ever been tainted by such a blatant vote-buying exercise.
The FLP has consistently held that the 2001 general election was not free
and fair – marred by vote-buying/bribery, defective electoral rolls, official bias
and systematic vote-rigging. As a result, the FLP was deprived of victory in
at least six marginal Open constituencies, which altered the results in favour
of the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL).
A detailed report highlighting cases relating to vote-rigging, tampering
with ballot papers and ballot boxes was submitted to the then Supervisor of
Elections, Walter Rigamoto, but he failed to investigate any of these, or to
treat the matter with the seriousness it deserved. His failure to do so meant
that similar malpractices and electoral fraud were again practised in the 2006
election.
tainted elections 349
The 2006 election
The conduct of the 2006 poll was deeply flawed right from the beginning
– starting with the voter registration exercise. I must also comment critically on
the fact that the Supervisor of Elections, Semesa Karavaki, was on study leave
until January 2006 – just four months before the May election. In his absence,
Tomasi Tui was sent from the Prime Minister’s office as Deputy Supervisor
– the whole process was controlled from the Prime Minister’s office. Tui was
subsequently promoted to be Commissioner Eastern.
Flawed voter registration
To begin with, house-to-house voter registration was confined to a mere two
weeks, 12–23 September 2005 – clearly not enough time to compile an entirely
new electoral roll. Requests by political parties to have the house-to-house
registration period extended were not granted.
Furthermore, the process was highly politicized and lacked transparency;
enumerators were hand-picked by staff of the Elections Office and District
Offices – often friends and family of officials. Voter registration teams were
headed by persons who were politically affiliated and not impartial. A case
in point is that of Prem Singh, a National Federation Party (NFP) candidate
for the Nadi Open constituency, who was assigned registration and voter
education activities by virtue of his being an advisory councillor. Subsequently,
irregularities in the registration of voters in the Nadi Open constituency were
noticed – some 1,400 voters in localities known to be FLP strongholds were
found registered in the adjacent rural constituency of Yasawa/Nawaka Open.
Unfortunately for him, the displacement of these voters was picked up by FLP
branch representatives, and the matter rectified.
There was also gross ethnic imbalance in the recruitment of enumerators.
Out of a total of 4,284 enumerators, only 407 were Indians; 155 were from
other minority communities, while the rest, 3,722, were indigenous Fijians.
This would clearly have created communication problems for Indians in rural
areas, and for the elderly, many of whom cannot speak English. And, no doubt,
such biased recruitment was responsible for much of the mess in the voter
registration process, as well as for the very high number of invalid votes in the
2006 election compared with the 2001 election.
350 from election to coup in fiji
Parliamentary questions from the FLP asking for details on enumerators for
each constituency were rejected by the Prime Minister, who made the ludicrous
claim that such information was of a confidential nature. His refusal to provide
the information underscored the lack of transparency in the process, and further
fuelled suspicion that something was afoot.
In the past, school teachers, civil servants and political parties conducted
the registration of voters. Why was this convention not followed in the 2006
election?
The FLP-conducted surveys of the registration process found the following
major flaws/discrepancies:
• Many Indian households in rural and urban areas were not visited by
enumerators – leaving large segments of Indian voters unregistered. In
Labasa, for instance, just a three-day survey by the FLP in March 2006
uncovered 805 voters who had not been registered. Likewise, significant
numbers of voters in Korovuto, Nawaicoba and Meigunya in Nadi were
not registered.
• Hundreds of voters were either not given registration slips to show they
had registered or were given blank slips – they were told slips were not
necessary.
• People living in the same house were registered to vote in different
constituencies – a subtle way of disenfranchising voters, as they would
not be aware that their names were actually on the rolls of adjacent
constituencies. They would simply assume that their names were missing
from electoral rolls. Such attempts to disenfranchise voters would have
made a crucial difference in closely fought Open constituencies, particularly
those in the Central Division.
• For some reason, registration was not carried out on weekends when
most people can be found at home. Enumerators did not make call-back
visits.
• Faulty registration slips – numerous cases of names incorrectly entered,
blanks left for constituencies or slips tagged ‘to be decided’ – rendered the
entire registration invalid.
• Married women were deliberately asked to register under their maiden
names – again this would have disenfranchised the voter.
tainted elections 351
• Hundreds of bizarre cases were noted of people listed in wrong
constituencies that were not even borderline cases. The following cases
recorded in the Ba, Lautoka and Nadi districts serve as illustration:
- 1,300–1,500 voters in the settlements of Nalovo and Uciwai, well within the
boundary of the Nadi Rural Indian Communal constituency, were registered
in the Nadroga Indian Communal constituency
- over 1,000 residents from Sariyawa, Savusavu, Waica and Momi were
registered in the Nadroga Indian Communal constituency instead of Nadi
Rural Indian constituency
- over 1,000 voters from the Nadroga Indian Communal constituency were
wrongly listed in the Nadi Rural Indian Communal constituency
- 1,321 voters were wrongly listed in the Ba West Indian Communal
constituency instead of the Ba East Indian Communal constituency
- 373 voters from the Ba Open constituency were listed in the Magodro Open
constituency
- about 600 voters residing in Meigunya and Votualevu in the Nadi Urban
Indian constituency were registered instead in the Nadi Rural Indian
constituency
- 1,900 residents, mostly Fijians, from the Magodro Open constituency were
listed in the Vuda Open constituency
- I ndian and General voters were also found registered in Fijian Communal
constituencies
- Some 2,000 voters from the Vuda Indian Communal constituency were
registered elsewhere, particularly the Lautoka Rural Indian constituency.
Such high numbers of discrepancies, irregularities and anomalies are clear
evidence of a calculated and orchestrated move to disenfranchise Indian voters.
They were too numerous to be merely accidental omissions or errors.
These irregularities/anomalies were regularly brought to the attention of
the Supervisor of Elections and the Electoral Commission as they surfaced.
In most cases, however, they remained uncorrected by polling day, often
despite assurances that they would be addressed. In the case of the 1,321
voters from the Ba East Indian Communal constituency wrongly listed in
the Ba West Indian Communal constituency, although the Elections Office
agreed to rectify a significant number of these, during polling week it was
discovered that no such rectification had indeed been made.
352 from election to coup in fiji
Observer missions have been unanimous in their criticism of flaws in the
registration process that saw scores, if not hundreds, of voters turn up at the
polling stations only to be told their names could not be found on the electoral
rolls. These people were effectively disenfranchised. And, as I have mentioned
earlier, in closely fought open seats, such malpractices made a difference to
the final result.
The EU observer mission noted that in a fifth of all polling stations visited,
a number of voters were denied their right to vote. Names were misspelled,
constituencies were wrongly allocated, and eligible voters were not registered.
Some registered in the Communal constituencies, but not in the Open
constituencies, should have been allowed to vote but were not.
Vote-buying
Blatant vote-buying/bribery by the SDL continued to be a feature of the 2006
general election, although not to the same extent perhaps as in the agricultural
scam prior to the 2001 poll, when fishing boats, brush cutters, cooking utensils
and money were blatantly handed out.
Soon after it had announced the dates for the 2006 general election, the
SDL began giving out money for education, ostensibly earmarked for the
poor. The point is that in the past five years since its inception, the SDL had
not once spared a thought for these struggling students from poor families, at
least to public knowledge. In another unprecedented move, Indian religious
organizations and women’s groups this time received money, pots and pans
etc. Just two days before polling began, TV showed footage of an Indian man
overwhelmed by the generosity of the Prime Minister who had gifted a brush
cutter to him after his was stolen. Such altruistic gestures from the PM had
been unheard of in the previous five years!
SDL’s campaign director Jale Baba openly boasted that the party had
spent $7.5 million for the 2006 election campaign. Where did the money
go? And, more interestingly, where did such a large amount of cash come
from? Was it corrupt money? The campaign could not have cost so much.
It is well known that money was handed out to chiefs in the Ba Province,
even during polling week. Buying votes in any form is a criminal act under
the Electoral Act.
tainted elections 353
Failure to comply with the Electoral Act
Considering all the errors, irregularities, anomalies and omissions that surfaced
during the registration process, it was important that the final electoral rolls
be published in time to allow thorough scrutiny. Sections 22 and 23 of the
Electoral Act provide a mandatory period of 42 days for objections to be lodged
in regard to incorrect entries in the electoral rolls and their settlement by the
Elections Office.
This important requirement was not met. Provisional rolls carrying only
registrations made up until 31 December 2005 were released to political parties
on 17 February 2006. The public was given a mere two working weeks to
scrutinize the rolls, from Thursday 23 February to 13 March 2006. The main
roll closed on 24 March. All registration after this was to go in a supplementary
roll, with registration finally closing on 4 April – a week after the writ of
election was issued. The so-called main roll, clearly a misnomer, was released
to political parties in batches from 29 March onwards, and thereafter opened
for public scrutiny.
Our major concern, however, is that the final main roll, which included the
provisional and supplementary rolls, was not released until 27 April – and then
only for 33 (less than half the) constituencies. Another 35 rolls were released
on 29 April, a week before polling started. And the final three came out on 2
May. These were for the Nasinu/Rewa Open, the Magodro Open and the Nadi
Open constituencies – giving barely three days for voters to scrutinize the rolls.
Clearly the Supervisor of Elections and the Electoral Commission had failed
to meet their obligations under the Electoral Act as far as publication of the
electoral rolls was concerned. They had also failed to update the electoral rolls
each year, as required by the Act.
Furthermore, the Supervisor of Elections failed to comply with the requirement
of the Act to gazette the names of candidates standing for each constituency,
following their nominations. He also failed to meet the requirement to gazette
all polling stations, and dates for the opening and closure of each station, as
required under the Electoral Act. Had this been done, a lot of the confusion,
and, in at least two instances, unscheduled polling without the knowledge of
most political parties and candidates (except for the SDL), would have been
avoided. Dates for polling at various stations kept changing right into polling
354 from election to coup in fiji
week. It was not until after polling, when the count was nearing its end at the
Veiuto Centre, that a gazette notice was issued listing schedules for polling
stations; it was backdated to comply with the Act. The Electoral Commission
must be held equally guilty for this omission. Indeed, they rendered themselves
culpable by advising that all preparations for the proper conduct of the election
would be completed before polling began.
It is clear that the Office of the Supervisor of Elections was just not ready for
the rushed national poll beginning on 6 May 2006. The Supervisor of Elections
failed in his duty to inform the Prime Minister of this fact when he was asked
if he would be ready in time for early elections.
Both the Supervisor of Elections and the Electoral Commission must accept
full responsibility for the incompetence, the inefficiencies, the delays and the
shambles that characterized the 2006 poll. Having given the nation, and the
Prime Minister, over-confident assurances that the electoral machinery would
be ready for the rushed poll, they must now accept the blame for seriously
compromising the integrity of the 2006 general election.
Indian voters misled by the Elections Office
Indian voters were told in advertisements placed by the Elections Office that they
could continue to register until 8 July 2006, well after elections were over, when
advertisements in Fijian and English gave the correct date of 4 April 2006.
How-to-vote TV commercials placed by the Elections Office informed Indian
voters they could vote by ticking either above or below the line, when to tick
below the line rendered the vote invalid. In contrast, the Fijian and English
versions of the advertisements gave the correct information. Despite repeated
complaints by the FLP, the incorrect Hindi advertisement was not removed
until I personally called up the chairman of the Electoral Commission, Graham
Leung, after 8 pm on Friday 5 May, the eve of the polls, to complain. He then
ordered television officials to remove it.
Excessive printing of ballot papers
The FLP has reliable information that excessive ballot papers were printed
for a number of constituencies. We believe that these were used to stuff ballot
boxes in certain crucial constituencies, as in 2001. Candidates, for instance,
are baffled by the very high number of ballots cast in the Nasinu/Nausori
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Communal constituencies – numbers which belie the low voter turn-out
experienced – and by the lack of correlation between Communal votes and
those cast for the open seats.
Polling
The first day of polling was an utter shambles, as everyone knows. This is despite
assurances by the Supervisor of Elections through the media that his Office
was ‘ready to roll’ come 7 am Saturday 6 May. The truth is that ballot papers
were not ready at most of the polling stations scheduled to open at 7 am on 6
May. A number of polling stations did not open until well into the afternoon
– the polling station at Kalabo opened at 1.30 pm, that at Colo-I-Suva at 12
noon – but the loss in polling time was never made up.
The problem with unavailability of ballot papers plagued various stations
throughout the week. It caused unnecessary frustration to voters who had to
queue for hours on end, and in some cases walk away without voting because
the polling station had either not received the ballot papers or had run out of
them. Here again, there was a noticeable racial and political bias that could not
be ignored. It was pretty obvious that, while polling for the indigenous Fijian
streams at almost all polling stations went on unhindered, it was the Indian
constituencies and those for other minorities that were affected.
Senior Labour executive and candidate for the Nasinu Indian Communal
seat, Krishna Datt, reckoned that much of the ‘mess’ was deliberate. ‘It is
designed to frustrate the process and disenfranchise Indian voters’, he said.
The Leader of the United Peoples Party, Mick Beddoes, expressed similar
sentiments in his report:
The scale of the disruptions and level of unpreparedness is far too extensive for it to be
a simple matter of mass incompetence on the part of the Electoral Commission and the
Supervisor of Elections and his officials.
The fact that the Fijian voters, ballot boxes and ballot papers were in adequate
supply and in a state of preparedness and [that] they were voting in many cases
for up to 4–5 hours before the first General or Indian ballot papers and boxes
arrived, adds greater suspicion about the intent of electoral officials.1
The large numbers of voters who turned up to vote with registration slips, but
found their names missing from voter rolls, reflected the earlier deliberate mess356
from election to coup in fiji
up in the voter registration process. Had the Electoral Commission accepted
my request made in May 2005 that registration forms be made accountable
documents, this problem would have been avoided. As the problem began to
surface with consistent regularity at polling stations, a request was made to the
Electoral Commission that voters with registration slips whose names were not
on electoral rolls be allowed to vote. This is the Commission’s response:
If a person’s name does not appear on the electoral rolls, that person is not a registered
voter and, therefore, not entitled to vote.
This response was both disappointing and unexpected, because the voter was
being deprived of his or her democratic right to vote, not through any fault of
his or her own, but because of a mess-up by the Elections Office, of which the
Commission had been kept fully informed. It also failed to appreciate that voting
is compulsory in Fiji, and a denial of a person’s right to vote is tantamount to
disenfranchising the voter.
The American Ambassador, Larry Dinger, clearly concerned at the high
number of voters being turned away because of missing names, pointed out
that:
In my country, problems like this of missing names are catered for when a provisional roll
is created so that the person can vote and his vote counted.2
In some cases where the presiding officer did allow such people to vote, these
votes were kept separate, but in the end not included in the final count.
In tightly contested marginal seats, such as the Laucala Open, which was lost
by the Labour Party by a mere 11 votes, missing names become crucial.
Nasinu polling
At least 200,000 people live in the Suva/Nausori corridor – most of them travel
to Suva to work. Due to the very heavy traffic congestion during peak hours,
workers generally leave home well before 7 am to get to the city by reporting time
at 8 am. Likewise, in the evenings, with a 5 pm knock-off on week-days, they
do not get home until 6 pm or after. Despite these considerations, all polling
stations in the heavily populated Nasinu region were scheduled to close at 5
pm. This is contrary to past practice. Even though the Commissioner Central
said presiding officers had the discretion to stay open late, almost all polling
tainted elections 357
stations closed promptly at 5 pm, discouraging voters from queuing to vote.
In the rare cases where polling stations did stay open, they conveniently found
that they had run out of ballot papers. The FLP made several written as well
as verbal requests to election officials to accommodate voters who turned up
after 5 pm, but to no avail.
The impression thus created, was that every effort was being made to
frustrate voting rather than facilitate it. As far as the FLP is concerned, this
was an orchestrated plan to frustrate Labour supporters from voting in these
crucial seats – it must be noted that constituencies in the Nasinu area have large
numbers of low-paid workers and squatters who traditionally vote Labour.
One must also note that polling stations on a number of occasions did not
open at 7 am as scheduled, but several hours later. To cite a few examples:
• On 6 May, the Training and Productive Authority of Fiji polling station
opened at 11.30 am instead of 7 am – hundreds of voters who had turned
up early to vote went away frustrated
• On 6 and 8 May, Nepani polling station opened at 9 am instead of 7 am
– a number of FLP supporters went away without voting; it closed at 5
pm sharp
• At Rishikul Primary School, on 10 May, polling started one and a half
hours late but finished promptly at 5 pm
• At Wailoku, polling finished at 3 pm even though voters were lined up to
vote
• At the Assemblies of God Primary School polling station in Suva on 6
May, polling began late in the morning but ended sharply at 5 pm. It was
noticed that, while Fijian voters were allowed in to vote after 5 pm, Indians
were refused entry.
Unscheduled polling
As mentioned earlier, the Elections Office kept making last-minute changes to
polling schedules that were not gazetted as required under the Electoral Act. Once
polling programs had been finalized and publicized, they should not have been
changed. If changes were absolutely necessary due to unforeseen circumstances,
then it was the responsibility of the election officials to ensure that all candidates
and political parties were notified of the change, in writing.
358 from election to coup in fiji
The most bizarre case was the incident at the Rishikul Nadera Primary School
on Thursday 11 May. Polling at the primary school in Reba Circle was not
scheduled to take place until Friday 12 May. For some inexplicable reason, the
Elections Office decided to move polling there forward to Thursday 11 May
without notifying all political parties or candidates. Mystifyingly, only the SDL
was aware of the changed polling schedule at this station and were there to kick
it off. Others heard about it closer to noon. Several serious concerns arise:
• Why was a last minute switch necessary?
• Why were other candidates and political parties not informed of the switch,
but SDL was?
• How could election officials allow ballot boxes to be opened in the morning
without other candidates or their agents being present?
Clearly, there was mischief afoot. Inquiries by the Labour candidate, Vijay
Nair, disclosed that the directive to hold polling one day ahead of schedule
was issued by the District Officer’s office in Suva. This incident is a clear case
of collusion between election officials and the SDL. It becomes even more
significant considering that Nair lost this seat by a mere 11 votes. Surprisingly,
none of the observer missions made note of this incident. Labour’s request that
voting that took place at this particular station on Thursday 11 be disallowed
was ignored by the Electoral Commission.
Such malpractices added to the general air of suspicion regarding the
impartiality of the Electoral Office. The fact that a serious incident of this
nature can be treated so casually by those in authority bodes ill for future
elections in Fiji.
Ballot boxes and the count
There were numerous mishaps with ballot boxes that should never have been
tolerated. Boxes breaking up, as occurred in 2006, is something unheard of
in Fiji’s electoral experience. Ballot boxes were not properly sealed – a point
noted even by observer missions. The EU mission recommended that in future
plastic boxes be used to ensure greater security. The law requires ballot boxes
to be properly sealed leaving no room for tampering with ballot papers. By
failing to ensure this, the Elections Office breached section 86 (1) (a) of the
Electoral Act.
tainted elections 359
There were concerns about ballot boxes being left unguarded for hours at
polling stations before they were transported to the count centre. One such
instance occurred on Tuesday 9 May at the Naivitavaya Church Hall polling
station for the Laucala Open constituency. The ballot boxes were left unattended
for three hours until 9 pm, while the presiding officer went to drink grog at
the SDL shed. It wasn’t until a complaint was lodged with the Elections Office
that the boxes were finally taken to the Flagstaff operations centre. The entire
incident was repeated the following day. This case is particularly significant
because ballot papers for Box No. C404L from this polling station could not
be reconciled at the count. According to the presiding officer, the total number
of ballot papers issued was 1,200; yet total votes cast were only 463 – what
happened to the balance of 737 ballot papers?
From this same polling station, five ballot boxes were placed aside following
queries from FLP agents because papers could not be reconciled. However, a
little later, the count team-leader said he had spoken to the presiding officer,
who said he had made a mistake in stating the number of ballot papers issued.
They then brought back the boxes put aside to include them in the count.
Surprisingly, however, only four not five boxes were brought back. What
happened to the fifth box? There was an absolute lack of transparency in
dealing with this complaint. And how could the presiding officer have made
such a huge mistake in stating the total number of ballot papers issued? Was
he grossly incompetent or just plain dishonest?
Another questionable incident concerned Box No. C579 from the Vatuwaqa
Church Hall polling station. Here the total votes cast were 12; total ballot
papers issued were also 12. Yet, the actual count revealed 21 ballot papers in
the box. Where did the extra ballot papers come from?
The FLP candidate for the Nausori/Naitasiri Open constituency maintains
that 15 extra ballot boxes were introduced at the count for her constituency.
The manner in which the count officials and the Returning Officer dealt with
this complaint again lacked transparency and smacked of political bias.
Count for the Laucala Open constituency
By the morning of Wednesday 17 May, it became obvious that the election,
so closely fought, now hinged on the marginal open seats in the Suva/Nasinu/
360 from election to coup in fiji
Nausori corridor. The Nausori/Naitasiri Open constituency, stuffed with 15
extra boxes, emerged a winner for the SDL.
The Samabula/Tamavua Open seat was wrested by Labour after a tough
count battle, during which the bias of election officials towards the SDL
became very obvious.
The Suva Open went to the SDL in another close battle, but it was confidently
expected that Labour would win the two Nasinu Open constituencies – the
Laucala Open and the Nasinu/Rewa Open – in view of the very high polling
(90%) for the corresponding Indian communal seats in these constituencies.
Labour had good preferences and too high a lead in the Nasinu/Rewa Open
constituency for games to be played there. The Laucala Open constituency thus
became crucial if the SDL were to win the election. Despite the very close run,
it should be noted that Mr Qarase had already hailed victory for the SDL. He
therefore had to win Laucala Open by hook or by crook.
As the first count drew to a close on Wednesday, there was confusion. It
seemed the SDL had asked for a recount, and polling agents were waiting for
a decision while count officials left the room to confer. However, as everyone
waited for the final outcome, suddenly, the count team began sealing up the
ballot papers even though an official announcement declaring the winner had
not been made. Just then, the Labour team at the count centre was informed
via a phone call that the radios were announcing an SDL victory for the seat
by 17 votes.
I was en route to Suva from the west when I received this stunning news.
I immediately called the chairman of the Electoral Commission, Mr Graham
Leung, and informed him that we wanted an immediate recount and that no
papers should leave the room in the meanwhile. It was as well that Mr Leung
came down because the Commissioner Central was obviously hell-bent on
packing up the ballot papers and having them removed from the room. Mr
Leung put a halt to this, and the Commissioner had no choice but to allow a
recount. In the recount stage, a serious breach of procedure took place. The
count team refused to recheck the validity of votes earlier declared valid. The
fact that, despite all this, the difference in votes was reduced from 17 to 11
was significant. Had the team rechecked the validity of the ‘valid’ votes, it is
possible that the result may have been overturned altogether.
tainted elections 361
Independent observer Father Arms, who was present at this stage, says in his
report that he had noted at least two invalid ballot papers put into the valid
votes box. He makes the following observation:
The last seat won that gave the SDL an absolute majority of seats, was won only on the
mis-conducted recount ….where the difference between the SDL and the FLP was only
11 votes. Had the FLP won that seat (which they might have under fairer circumstances
or if the recount had been conducted properly) it is possible they would have been able
to form a government…
If there had not been the mistakes that worked against the Indo-Fijians and if the electoral
administration had been properly balanced ethnically, another seat or two might have
gone the way of the FLP.
Add to this the unacceptably high percentage of invalid votes, and it becomes clear that
Fiji has a few important, but quite manageable, things to do in order to ensure free and
fair elections.3
Transporting and security of ballot boxes
There were other questionable and untoward happenings. For instance, why
were private security companies with very close links with the SDL used in the
Central Division to transport boxes to the count centre and to guard boxes?
Trucks belonging to Global Risks, owned by Sakiusa Raivoce, a known SDL
supporter and brother-in-law to Ratu Jone Kubuabola, were used to transport
ballot boxes. Sunia Cama’s (security/bailiff ) men, dubbed the ‘box boys’,
provided 24-hour security at the Veiuto count centre, sleeping on the premises.
It was not their job under the Electoral Act. Why could not the police provide
this security? Sunia Cama is a former professional boxer with known extremist
nationalist sympathies and a relative of Jale Baba, SDL’s campaign director.
Win Gate Marketing Company Ltd was also used to transport boxes. The
company has close association with Jale Baba in the carting of mahogany logs
from Tailevu North to the mills.
The Electoral Act requires transportation of ballot boxes to be carried out
by trustworthy companies. The above are too closely associated with the SDL
to be classified trustworthy or impartial.
I have attempted to highlight a few of the more glaring and questionable
practices and acts, and examples of non-compliance with electoral laws, that
362 from election to coup in fiji
compromised the integrity of the 2006 poll. The trend emerged in 2001. Fiji
has held eight general elections since independence. Apart from minor concerns
and hiccups, the integrity of the first six elections was beyond suspicion. High
standards and professionalism were generally the hallmarks of our electoral
machinery.
The manipulation, rigging and deliberate disenfranchisement that
characterized the 2001 and 2006 general elections should be a concern to all
citizens who believe in the integrity of the democratic process. What went wrong
occurred with too much regularity to be simply brushed off as incompetence
or oversight. As Shakespeare’s Hamlet would say, there was clearly ‘a method
to the madness’.
The neutrality of the civil service and the police is now a serious issue. In
2006, there was a palpable, pervasive aura of pro-SDL sentiment among both
the police and count officials, certainly in the Central Division count centre.
This could stem from the fact that there was gross racial imbalance in the
recruitment of count officials, and in the police presence on the premises.
Indeed, when the count seemed to go against the SDL, those present could
sense the palpable hostility through the body language, and even in the actions,
of officials and police. At times, the situation bordered on being dangerous for
FLP supporters. A clear demonstration of such bias was the spontaneous manner
in which Fijian count officials burst out singing as SDL emerged ‘victorious’.
Unless timely action is taken to weed out these malpractices, they will become
a cancer that will completely destroy the integrity of our electoral machinery.
Conclusion
The reports of all observer groups must be thoroughly studied, and their
recommendations implemented. The final report of the EU observer mission,
for instance, makes comprehensive recommendations to improve the system
and ensure greater security.
Major concerns are the registration and preparation of the electoral rolls and
the conduct of postal ballots. Since 2001, there has been an alarming increase in
the number of postal ballots despite the considerable increase in polling stations
to facilitate voting in remote areas. For instance, there were some 20,000 postal
ballots in 2006 – an unbelievably high number. Furthermore, postal ballots
tainted elections 363
were being allowed even after polling proper started, and late postal ballots
were included in the count well after the legal deadline of Monday 15 May.
The process clearly lacked transparency.
Postal ballots can be a vehicle for vote-rigging, and must be brought under
control. The EU observer mission report is highly critical of the manner in
which postal voting was conducted and reports as follows:
The vulnerability of the postal voting exercise to errors or fraud (impersonation) was
increased with the provision to allow postal voting in person to continue during the official
ordinary polling days and the fact that postal ballot boxes were not sealed overnight…
Party agents were not present throughout the postal polling process and in any case would
not have been allowed to stay at the premises overnight.
It is obvious that Fiji can no longer rely on the neutrality of the civil service
to conduct future elections. An independent body must be created to conduct
elections in order to restore the credibility of the process. Ethnic parity in the
appointment of elections officials, both in the Elections Office and at the polling
and counting stages, must be paramount.
All observer group reports have emphasised the need for Fiji to move away
from the current emphasis on communal voting, and to encourage more crossracial
voting. This entails a move away from having a majority of Communal
constituencies to having more Open constituencies. This is something that the
FLP fought vigorously for during negotiations on the 1997 Constitution. Our
call was not heeded then. It is now obvious to a wider group of observers and
political pundits that, unless constitutional reforms take place to embrace more
Open constituencies as opposed to Communal constituencies, national politics
will continue to be dominated by ethnic rather than national considerations.
In this respect, I wish to deny the observation made by the EU in its report
that the two major political parties, namely the SDL and the FLP , staged
a highly ethnic political campaign rather than concentrating on issues of
national concern. The FLP at no stage played racial politics in its 2006 election
campaign, and this can be clearly gauged from our election manifesto as well as
from advertisements placed in the newspapers and on television. If anything,
there was an attempt to woo indigenous Fijian votes. Indeed, our entire 2006
election campaign focused on national issues. I call on observer groups to be
fair in compiling their reports.
364 from election to coup in fiji
The SDL stole the 2001 and 2006 general elections. It used, at a conservative
guess, over $40 million of taxpayers’ money under the guise of agricultural
programs, to buy votes. The Office of the Supervisor of Elections, senior
electoral officers and divisional commissioners facilitated an SDL victory.
Notes
1. L etter to Chairman of Electoral Commission, 8 May 2006 (unpublished).
2. Daily Post, 9 May 2006.
3. ‘Report of Fr David Arms; Observer to the 2006 Fiji General Elections, circulated 18 September 2006, unpublished, p.1.
